

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CCO-00 /031 W

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P R 231120Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2501

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 5572

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JO, XF

SUBJ: JORDANIAN FREEZE

REF: AMMAN 5556

1. REFTEL FORWARDS TEXT JORDANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT FREEZING ITS POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS ON MIDDLE EAST IN RESPONSE TO TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY EGYPT, SYRIA AND PLO IN CAIRO SEPTEMBER 21.

2. BACKGROUND: JORDANIAN REACTION COMES IN RESPONSE TO CONTINUING INTER-ARAB DIFFERENCES OVER ROLE OF PLO AND JORDAN IN REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS. JORDANIANS, IN ALEXANDRIA COMMUNIQUE, HAD BEEN IN PROCESS OF ATTEMPTING TO BUILD SUPPORT AND MEND FENCES WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA IN HOPES OF GETTING LEG UP ON PLO. COMMUNIQUE REVERSES EGYPTIAN, AND POSSIBLY TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION OF SYRIAN

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SUPPORT VIS-A-VIS PLO AND GOJ. JORDANIAN EFFORTS TO BUILD

CONTINUING EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN SUPPORT IN "HOUSE OF CARDS" FASHION IS DEPENDENT IN LAST ANALYSIS ON DEGREE TO WHICH BOTH EGYPT AND SYRIA PERCEIVE JORDAN AS BEING OF ANY REAL VALUE IN EFFORTS TO SEEK NEGOTIATED PEACE. CAIRO SEPTEMBER 21 COMMUNIQUE CHANGES EGYPTIAN POSITION ONCE AGAIN AND AT LEAST ONE ACE HAS BEEN PULLED FROM HOUSE OF CARDS STRUCTURE ON WHICH JORDANIANS WERE COUNTING FOR INCREASED SUPPORT.

3. WE UNDERSTAND JORDANIANS WERE TEMPTED TO REACT IN EVEN MORE HEATED AND TEMPERMENTAL FASHION WHEN NEWS OF TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE FIRST REACHED THEM ON SEPTEMBER 21. HOWEVER THEY DECIDED TO WAIT OVERNIGHT AND ALSO QUITE POSSIBLY TO HEAR OUT SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM WHO VISITED AMMAN MORNING SEPTEMBER 22.

4. WE UNDERSTAND THAT JORDANIANS PARTICULARLY OBJECTED TO TWO ELEMENTS OF COMMUNIQUE: (A) USE OF ALGIERS FORMULA "SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVES" TO DESCRIBE PLO'S POSITION, AND (B) STATEMENT THAT INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY WOULD ASSUME GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY WEST BANK LAND RETURNED BY ISRAEL.

5. JORDANIAN MOTIVES AS WE ASSESS THEM NOW IN TAKING THIS STEP IN THE CONTINUING INTER-ARAB SQUABBLE ABOUT CONTRASTING ROLES OF GOJ AND PLO WERE: (A) FINDING A REASONABLY DIGNIFIED WAY OF HANDLING QUESTION, AND (B) AVOIDING CLOSING OFF ITS NEGOTIATING OPTION, AND (C) TRYING TO FLEX FOR BENEFIT OF US AND OTHERS SUCH NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE AS IT BELIEVES IT HAS.

6. AMBIGUITIES IN JORDANIAN "COMMUNIQUE" ARE READILY APPARENT. THEY INCLUDE (A) FUZZINESS OVER FULL EXTENT TO WHICH JORDANIAN FREEZE APPLIES -- DOES IT COVER ONLY GENEVA CONFERENCE REGARDING WHICH JORDAN HAS ALREADY SAID IT WILL NOT ATTEND UNTIL IT GETS DISENGAGEMENT, OR EXTEND BEYOND AS IMPLIED IN STATEMENT TO ALL NEGOTIATION EFFORTS WHICH MAY BE LINKED TO GENEVA, UNSC RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 242. WE SUSPECT AMBIGUITY HERE IS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO AVOID OVER-COMMITMENT TO A PETULANT PULL-OUT ON PART OF JORDANIANS. (B) SECOND ISSUE OF FUZZINESS IS RELATED TO TEMPORARY  
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NATURE OF JORDANIAN DECISION UNTIL LATE OCTOBER ARAB SUMMIT. WHILE EXCUSE IS THAT JORDAN WISHES TO HAVE VIEWS OF ALL ARABS -- AND HENCE HAVE THEM ALSO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY -- IT CLEARLY ALSO GIVES JORDANIANS LOTS OF MANEUVERING ROOM. (C) THIRD AREA IS WHETHER FREEZE COVERS ONLY INTER-ARAB QUESTIONS OR EXTENDS BEYOND.

7. JORDANIANS HAVE FOR SOME TIME FELT THEIR NEGOTIATING

LEVERAGE, IF THEY HAD ANY AT ALL, DEPENDED UPON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO OPT OUT OF NEGOTIATIONS. THEY PRESUME THAT IN LONG RUN ISRAELIS WOULD PREFER AN AGREEMENT SOON WITH JORDAN RATHER THAN HANGING ON AND LEAVING WAY OPEN ONLY FOR ARAFAT OR SOMEONE LIKE HIM. SIMILARLY, THEY HAVE ASSESSED, PERHAPS OPTIMISTICALLY, VIEWS OF EGYPT AND SYRIA AS "REALISTIC" ENOUGH TO SEE THAT SHOULD THEY DESIRE A LASTING SETTLEMENT ON WEST BANK AS PART OF NEGOTIATED EFFORT IN MIDDLE EAST, JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO PLAY NEGOTIATING ROLE SINCE ISRAELI UNLIKELY TO DEAL WITH PLO. BOTH OF THESE RATIONALE CERTAINLY PLAYED A PART IN JORDANIAN ASSESSMENT THAT STEP WHICH IT HAS TAKEN WILL IN LONG RUN BE BENEFICIAL TO THEM.

8. THERE IS, AS WE HAVE REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, STRONG CURRENT OF EAST BANK OPINION WHICH FAVORS JORDAN OPTING OUT OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND WHICH WILL GREET WITH ENTHUSIASM STEP WHICH KING HAS TAKEN TO FREEZE HIS POSITION. THIS GROUP HAS SOME INTERNAL STRENGTH IN JORDAN, BUT WE BELIEVE IT IS MORE LIKELY TO TEMPER RATHER THAN SET THE COURSE FOR THE FUTURE. WEST BANKERS/PALESTINIANS HERE ARE GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED, BUT QUICK TO POINT OUT LOOPHOLES IN POSITION WHICH ALLOW FOR FLEXIBILITY. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT HOWEVER STRONGLY HE MIGHT TALK ABOUT OPTING OUT, KING IN LAST ANALYSIS BELIEVES THAT OTHER ARABS WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO COME TO HIM TO NEGOTIATE ON WEST BANK AS LONG AS ISRAELIS PERSIST, WHICH HE EXPECTS WILL BE FOR A LONG TIME, IN REFUSING TO DEAL WITH PLO.

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ACTION SS-30

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P R 231120Z SEP 74

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 5572

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

9. JORDANIANS HAVE VENTED MOST OF THEIR ANGER AT COMMUNIQUE ON EGYPT. THE CONTRAST WITH THE ALEXANDRIA COMMUNIQUE IS OBVIOUS. THEY SAY THAT SYRIANS HAVE GENERALLY LEVELED WITH THEM ON STRONG SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR PLO AND THAT THEY DID NOT EXPECT SYRIANS TO ACT OTHER THAN THE WAY THEY HAD.

10. JORDANIANS WOULD OBVIOUSLY LIKE TO HAVE US WEIGH IN ON THEIR SIDE WITH OTHER ARABS. THEY FEEL IN PARTICULAR THAT OUR GROWING INFLUENCE WITH EGYPTIANS, THEIR ATTACHMENT TO NEED FOR MOMENTUM IN MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEIR CONSEQUENT THREAT TO PULL OUT ALL WEIGH HEAVILY IN THAT DIRECTION. IN ADDITION, THEY HAVE PROBABLY BY FREEZING, REINFORCED GENERAL BELIEF THAT SADAT IS THE NEXT LOGICAL CANDIDATE TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAELIS. INDEED WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN COMMENT HERE THAT TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE WAS AT LEAST IN PART SADAT EFFORT TO STIMULATE REACTION FROM KING ALONG LINES SEPTEMBER 22 COMMUNIQUE IN EFFORT FURTHER TO SOLIDIFY SADAT'S POSITION THAT  
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EGYPT IS NEXT LOGICAL CANDIDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

11. OVER LONG TERM, JORDANIANS WOULD WISH OBVIOUSLY TO STAY IN THE GAME ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT UNITED ARAB VIEW AT PROPOSED OCTOBER 26 RABAT SUMMIT WILL FORCE THEIR RATIFICATION OF SEPTEMBER 22 POSITION AND THEREBY PUT IT ON PERMANENT BASIS. HOWEVER, INITIAL REACTIONS, READ HERE FROM CAIRO, ALREADY INDICATE THAT THERE IS SOME DRAWING BACK FROM EGYPTIAN STAND AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT OF OFFICIAL PRESS AL-AHRAM REQUESTING EDITORIALY THAT JORDAN RECONSIDER ITS VIEWS. THIS IS OFFSET BY REPORT THAT EGYPTIAN PRESS CLAIMS JORDANIAN FREEZE HAS BEEN DECIDED UPON TO COVER UP ARMS SALES TO SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA.

12. FINALLY, IT IS DIFICULT FROM HERE TO ASSESS EFFECT OF THIS MOVE ON CONSIDERATION PALESTINIAN ITEM IN UNGA. ON ONE HAND, PLO COULD WELL CONSIDER THAT MOMENTUM IS IN ITS DIRECTION AND ATTEMPT TO FORCE EARLY CONSIDERATION PALESTINIAN ITEM WITH A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR GOJ AND OTHERS TO ACCEPT BOTH IN TERMS OF QUESTION OF "REPRESENTATION" PALESTINIAN INTERESTS AND

ANY EFFORT TO CHANGE OR REINTERPRET UNSC 242. ALTERNATIVELY,  
PLO STRATEGY MAY BE TO ATTEMPT MAKE JORDAN FREEZE POSITION FINAL  
AS A RESULT OF ARAB SUMMIT. MOMENTUM GAINED BY TRILATERAL  
CONFERENCE AND JORDANIAN FREEZE COULD WELL ADD TO GOJ  
ISOLATION AT SUMMIT. STRONG SUMMIT POSITION WOULD  
PRESUMABLY ALSO FURTHER ENHANCE PLO POSITION AT UNGA.  
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## Message Attributes

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